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Abstract. There exist several automatic verification tools of crypto-
graphic protocols, but only few of them are able to check protocols in
presence of algebraic properties. Most of these tools are dealing either
with Exclusive-Or (XOR) and exponentiation properties, so-called Diffie-
Hellman (DH). In the last few years, the number of these tools increased
and some existing tools have been updated. Our aim is to compare their
performances by analysing a selection of cryptographic protocols using
XOR and DH. We compare execution time and memory consumption
for different versions of the following tools OFMC, CL-Atse, Scyther,
Tamarin, TA4SP, and extensions of ProVerif (XOR-ProVerif and DH-
ProVerif). Our evaluation shows that in most of the cases the new ver-
sions of the tools are faster but consume more memory. We also show
how the new tools: Tamarin, Scyther and TA4SP, can be compared to
previous ones. We also discover and understand for the protocol IKEv2-
DS a difference of modelling by the authors of different tools, which leads
to different security results. Finally, for Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman
properties, we construct two families of protocols Pxori and Pdhi that
allow us to clearly see for the first time the impact of the number of
operators and variables in the tools’ performances.
Keywords: Verification Tools for Cryptographic Protocols, Algebraic
Properties, Benchmarking, Performances’ Evaluations.
1 Introduction
Nowadays cryptographic protocols are commonly used to secure communica-
tion. They are more and more complex and analysing them clearly outpaces
humans capacities. Hence automatic formal verification is required in order
to design secure cryptographic protocols and to detect flaws. For this goal,
several automatic verification tools for analysing cryptographic protocols have
? This research was conducted with the support of the “Digital trust” Chair from the
University of Auvergne Foundation.
?? This work has been partially supported by the LabEx PERSYVAL-Lab (ANR–11-
LABX-0025).
been developed, like Avispa [ABB+05] (OFMC [BMV05], TA4SP [BHK04],
CL-Atse [Tur06], Sat-MC [AC05]), Tamarin [MSCB13], Scyther [Cre08], Her-
mes [BLP03], ProVerif [Bla01], NRL [Mea96a], Murphi [MMS97], Casper/FDR
[Low98,Ros95], Athena [SBP01], Maude-NPA [EMM07], STA [BB02], the tool
S3A [DSV03] and [CE02]. All these tools can verify one or several security prop-
erties and rely on different theoretical approaches, e.g., rewriting, solving con-
straints system, SAT-solvers, resolution of Horn clauses, or tree automata etc.
All these tools work in the symbolic world, where all messages are represented
by an algebra of terms. Moreover, they also consider the well-known Dolev-Yao
intruder model [DY81], where a powerful intruder is considered [Cer01]. This
intruder controls the network, listens, stops, forges, replays or modifies some
messages according to its capabilities and can play several sessions of a proto-
col. The perfect encryption hypothesis is often assumed, meaning that without
the secret key associated to an encrypted message it is not possible to decrypt
the cipher-text. In such model most of the tools are able to verify two security
properties: secrecy and authentication. The first property ensures that an in-
truder cannot learn a secret message. The authentication property means that
one participant of the protocol is sure to communicate with another one.
Historically, formal methods have been developed for analysing cryptographic
protocols after the flaw discovered by G. Lowe [Low96] 17 years after the publi-
cation of Needham-Schoreder protocol [NS78]. The security of this protocol has
been proven for one session using the BAN logic in [BAN90,BM94]. The flaw
discovered by G. Lowe [Low96] works because the intruder plays one session with
Alice and in the same time a second one with Bob. In this second session, Bob
believes that he is talking to Alice. Then the intruder learns the shared secret key
that Bob thinks that he shares with Alice. This example clearly shows that even
for a protocol of three messages the number of possible combinations outpaces
the humans’ capabilities.
In presence of algebraic properties, the number of possible combinations to
construct traces blows up. The situation is even worse because some attacks can
be missed. Let consider the following 3-pass Shamir protocol composed of three
messages, where {m}KA denotes the encryption of m with the secret key KA:
1. A → B : {m}KA
2. B → A : {{m}KA}KB
3. A → B : {m}KB
This protocol works only if the encryption has the following algebraic prop-
erty: {{m}KA}KB = {{m}KB}KA. In order to implement this protocol one can
use the One Time Pad (OTP) encryption, also known as Vernam encryption
because it is generally credited to Gilbert S. Vernam and Joseph O. Mauborgne,
but indeed it was invented 35 years early by Franck Miller [Bel11]. The en-
cryption of the message m with the key k is m ⊕ k. This encryption is per-
fectly secure according to Shanon information theory, meaning that without
knowing the key no information about the message is leaked [Vau05,BJL+10].
Moreover the OTP encryption is key commutative since: {{m}KA}KB = (m ⊕
KA) ⊕KB = (m ⊕KB) ⊕KA = {{m}KB}KA. Unfortunately combining the
OTP encryption and the 3-pass Shamir leads to an attack against a passive in-
truder that only listens to all communications between Alice and Bob. Hence
the intruder collects the following three messages: m ⊕KA; (m ⊕KA) ⊕KB;
m ⊕ KB. Then he can learn m just by performing the Exclusive-Or of these
three messages, since m = m ⊕ KA ⊕ (m ⊕ KA) ⊕ KB ⊕ m ⊕ KB. This
attack relies on the algebraic property of the encryption and cannot be de-
tected if the modelling of the encryption is not precise enough. It is why con-
sidering algebraic operators is important. In [CDL06] the authors proposed
a survey of exiting protocols dealing with algebraic properties. In order to
fill this gap, some tools have been designed to consider some algebraic prop-
erties [BMV05,Bla01,EMM07,KT09,KT08,Tur06,SMCB12]. Indeed doing auto-
matic verification in presence of an algebraic property is more challenging, it is
why there exist less tools that are able to deal with algebraic properties. More
precisely, the algebraic properties for Diffie-Hellman are only the commutativity
of the exponentiation: (ga)b = (gb)a. For Exclusive-Or the following four prop-
erties are considered: (A⊕B)⊕C = A⊕(B⊕C) (Associativity), A⊕B = B⊕A
(Commutativity), A⊕ 0 = A (Unit element), and A⊕A = 0 (Nilpotency)
Contributions: We compare performances of cryptographic verification tools that
are able to deal with two kinds of algebraic properties: Exclusive-Or and Diffie-
Hellman. In order to perform this evaluation, we analyse execution time and
also memory consumption for 21 protocols that use algebraic operators from the
survey [CDL06] or directly from the libraries proposed by each tool. Modelling
all these protocols in all the considered tools is a complex task, since it requires
to really understand each tool and to be able to write for each protocol the
corresponding input file in each specific language. We discover that the modelling
of one protocol differs in the library of Avispa and in the library of Scyther. Our
investigations show that Avispa finds a flaw and Scyther does not. By building
exactly the same models for the two tools, both are able to prove the security of
one version and to find an attack in the second one. It clearly demonstrates that
the modelling phases is crucial and often fancy even for experts. Finally for tools
that can deal with Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman, we construct two families
of protocols Pxori and Pdhi, in order to evaluate the impact of the number
of operators and variables used in a protocol. We discover that it provokes an
exponential blowup of the complexity. Having this in mind, the results of our
experimentations become clearer.
We would like to thank the designers of the tools that helped us to face some
modelling tricks we had for some protocols.
State-of-the-art: Comparing to the number of papers for describing and devel-
oping tools and the numbers of works that are using such tools to find flaws or
prove the security of one protocol, there are only few works that compare the
performances of cryptographic protocols verification tools. This comes from the
fact that it requires to know how all the tools work. Moreover it is a time con-
suming task since the protocols need to be coded in the different specific input
languages of each tool.
In 1996, C. Meadows [Mea96b] proposed a first comparison work that analy-
ses the approach G. Lowe used in FDR [Ros94] on the Needham-Schroeder proto-
col [NS78] with the one used in NRL [Mea96a]. It happened that both tools were
complementary as FDR is faster but requires outside assistance, while NRL was
slower but automatic. In 2002, the AVISS tool [ABB+02] was used to analyse
a large set of protocols and timing results are given. As this tool is composed
of three back-end tools, the aim was to compare these tools. In 2006, Avispa
[ABB+05]1 was created as the successor of AVISS and composed of the same
three back-end tools plus one new. These back-ends have been compared by L.
Vigano in [Vig06]. Still in 2006, M. Hussain et al. [HS06] qualitatively compared
Avispa and Hermes [BLP03], studying their complexity and ease to use. Her-
mes has been declared more suited for simple protocols while Avispa is better
when scalability is needed. In 2007, M. Cheminod et al. [CBD+07] provided a
comparison of S3A (Spi calculus Specifications Symbolic Analyzer) a prototype
of the work [DSV03], OFMC [BMV05], STA [BB02] and Casper/FDR [Low98].
The purpose was to check for each tool if it was able to deal with specific types
of flaw. In 2009, C. Cremers et al. proposed in [CLN09] a fair comparison of
Casper/FDR, ProVerif, Scyther and Avispa. Timings were given as well as a
modelling of state spaces for each tool. For the first time, the authors were able
to show the difference of performances between the Avispa tools. In 2010, N.
Dalal et al. [DSHJ10] compared the specifications of ProVerif and Scyther on
six various protocols. No timing was given since the objective was to show the
differences of the tools in term of features. Still in 2010, R. Patel et al. [PBP+10]
provided a detailed list of cryptographic protocols verification tools split into dif-
ferent categories depending of their inner working. They compared the features
of Scyther and and ProVerif.
All these works only compare selected tools on protocols that do not re-
quire algebraic properties except [PBP+10] that consider Diffie-Hellman using
ProVerif. In [LTV10], P. Lafourcade et al. analysed some protocols dealing with
algebraic properties. The results of this analysis clearly show that there is no
clear winner in term of efficiency. This work also conjectures that the tools are
influenced by the number of occurrences of the operator in the protocols. More-
over, none of them consider memory consumption.
Our aim is to revise the work of [LTV10], because new versions of compared
tools are now available and we also want to include new tools and protocols in the
comparison. Moreover we propose two families of protocols to give a first answer
to the conjecture given in [LTV10] and to understand which parameters influence
the performances of the tools dealing with Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman.
Outline: In Section 2, we present the different tools that we compare. In Sec-
tion 3, we explain the results of our benchmark. We also detail our experimen-
tations on the impact of the number of variables involved in Exclusive-Or and
Diffie-Hellman operations on the tools. Finally we conclude in Section 4.
1 http://www.avispa-project.org/
2 Tools
We present the six tools used for our comparison and give the different tool
versions used in our analysis. To the best of our knowledge, those are the main
free available tools dealing with two common algebraic properties used in cryp-
tographic protocols: Exclusive-Or or Diffie-Hellman.
CL-Atse [Tur06] (Version 2.2-5 (2006) and 2.3-4 (2009)) Constraint-Logic-
based Attack Searcher2, developed by M. Turuani, runs a protocol in all possible
ways over a finite set of sessions, translating traces into constraints. Constraints
are simplified thanks to heuristics and redundancy elimination techniques allow-
ing to decide whether some security properties have been violated or not.
OFMC [BMV03] (Version 2006-02-13 and 2014) The Open-source Fixed-
point Model-Checker3, developed by S. Mo¨rdersheim, applies symbolic analysis
to perform protocol falsification and bounded analysis also over a finite set of
sessions. The state space is explored in a demand-driven way.
TA4SP [BHKO04] (Version 2014) Tree Automata based on Automatic Ap-
proximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols4, developed by Y. Boichut,
approximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages and rewrit-
ing. For secrecy properties, it can either use over-approximation or under-appro-
ximation to show that the protocol is flawed or safe for any number of session.
However, no attack trace is provided by the tool and only the secrecy is consid-
ered in presence of algebraic properties.
CL-Atse, OFMC and TA4SP are backend tools used within Avispa (Auto-
mated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications). All these tools
take as input a common language called HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specifica-
tion Language).
ProVerif5 [Bla01,Bla04] (Version: 1.16 (2008) and 1.90 (2015)) developed by
B. Blanchet analyses an unbounded number of sessions. Inputs can be written
either in Horn clauses format or using a subset of the Pi-calculus. It uses over-
approximation techniques such as an abstraction of fresh nonce generation to
prove that a protocol satisfies user-given properties. If a property cannot be
proven, it reconstructs an attack’s trace.
In [KT08] (2008) and [KT09] (2009) R. Ku¨ster and T. Truderung proposed
two translators named XOR-ProVerif and DH-ProVerif. These tools respectively
transform a protocol using Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman properties, written
as Prolog file into a protocol in Horn clauses which is compatible with ProVerif.
Both of these tools require the version 5.6.14 of SWI/Prolog to work. Since
these works, ProVerif has been enhanced to support Diffie-Hellman on its own,
by adding a specific equational theory in each protocol specification.
Scyther6 [Cre08] (Version 1.1.3 (2014)) developed by C. Cremers, veri-
fies bounded and unbounded number of runs with guaranteed termination, us-
2 http://webloria.loria.fr/equipes/cassis/softwares/AtSe/
3 http://www.imm.dtu.dk/ samo/
4 http://www.univ-orleans.fr/lifo/membres/Yohan.Boichut/ta4sp.html
5 http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/bblanche/proverif/
6 https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/
ing a symbolic backwards search based on patterns. Scyther does not sup-
port Exclusive-Or or Diffie-Hellman off the shelf but under-approximates Diffie-
Hellman by giving the adversary the capability of rewriting such exponentiations
at fixed subterm positions, which are derived from the protocol specification.
This trick has been first introduced by C. Cremer in [Cre11] on the protocols
of IKEv1 and IKEv2 suite. Those modelizations are presented in the protocols’
library of the tool.
Tamarin7 [SMCB12,MSCB13] (Version 0.9.0 (2013)) is a security protocol
prover able to handle an unbounded number of sessions. Protocols are specified
as multiset rewriting systems with respect to (temporal) first-order properties.
It relies on Maude [CELM96] tool8 and only supports Diffie-Hellman equational
theory.
3 Experimentations and Discussion
We present the results on the modellings of the analysed protocols with OFMC,
CL-Atse, TA4SP, Tamarin, Scyther and extensions of ProVerif. We analyse the
same protocols as in the paper [LTV10] in order to see how the tools have been
updated. This list of the protocols in [LTV10] contains: Bull’s Authentication
Protocol [BO97,RS98], e-Auction [HTWSCK08], Gong’s Mutual Authentication
Protocol [Gon89], Salary Sum [Sch96], TMN [LR97a,TMN89], Wired Equivalent
Privacy Protocol [80299], Diffie-Hellman [DH76] and IKA [AST00]. We also add
some protocols that are given in the benchmarks of the new considered tools
(Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol [YL06], Internet Key Exchange
Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [Kau05,KHN+14]), NSPKxor [LR97b] and 3-Pass
Shamir described in the introduction. We selected these protocols as they were
either proposed by the tool’s authors or listed in the survey [CDL06].
Our experiments were run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4310U 2.00GHz CPU
with 16 GB of RAM. Memory usage per process is not limited (ulimit -m unlim-
ited). Timings and memory consumption were determined using the GNU time9
command computing the Real time and the Maximum Resident Set Size for each
run of each tool. All testcases were run with a timeout of 24h using the GNU
timeout10 command. All our codes of each protocol modeling for each tool are
availaible in [PL].
For accuracy reasons, we launched each run 50 times if it takes less than 1h
for the tool to analyse the protocol. Then we computed the mean of all timings
and memory usages. When it takes more than 1h, we restrict to 10 iterations. We
denote a protocol by -fix for its corrected version if any and v2 for its simplified
versions if needed.
Table 1 summarizes the secrecy results of tools dealing with Exclusive-Or
(OFMC, CL-Atse, TA4SP and ProVerif) on some protocols. Table 2 compiles
7 http://www.infsec.ethz.ch/research/software/tamarin.html
8 http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/download/
9 http://linux.die.net/man/1/time
10 http://linux.die.net/man/1/timeout
results we obtain on secrecy with all the tools on Diffie-Hellman based protocols.
Finally, Table 3 recaps results obtained by all the tools (but TA4SP which only
deals with secret) on protocols with authentication properties. Numbers in paren-
thesis denotes the number of property specified for each modelization. Notice
that TA4SP is able to run either in over-approximation or under-approximation.
However, due to the time taken by the tool, we were not able to check any pro-
tocol (except NSPKxor) using under-approximation within our timeout. Thus
all results from TA4SP only use over-approximation.
Obviously, the transformation algorithm proposed by R. Ku¨ster and T. Trude-
rung in [KT08] and [KT09] adds an overhead in terms of computation time and
memory usage. However, we found out that this overhead was often less than 1s
and 3000 Kb of memory consumption. It appears to be different only for BAPv2
and BAPv2-fix protocols for which it was respectively 1.78s and 6.05s (memory
was not blowing up). Except for these two protocols, the overhead induced by
the transformation was negligible and constant so it is not shown in our results.
It is important to notice that all tools do not have the same objectives.
CL-Atse and OFMC are designed to find attacks and stop once they found
one. TA4SP, Tamarin and Scyther are provers and try to find attacks on each
property specified even if they already violated one. ProVerif is also designed to
prove all the properties that are specified but the pretreatments added by R.
Kuesters et al. can make him stop once an attack is found or not depending on
the modelization (in particular the presence of begin and end statements). To be
completely fair, we need to check unsafe protocols one property after one other
to make sure all are tested. Obviously this is not needed for safe protocols since
all the properties must be verified for such verdict.
3.1 Comparing old and new versions of the tools
In [LTV10], the authors compared the performances of CL-Atse, OFMC and
ProVerif. Since then, they have been updated. We use the most recent version
of each tool in this comparison. Nevertheless, we also run all of our experimen-
tations using the same version than in [LTV10] to compare how the tools have
evolved. For all testcases, we computed the speedup indicator as the result of
S = ToldTnew where S is the resultant speedup and Told (resp. Tnew) is the timing
obtained with the old (new) version of the tool. We choose to not compute it
for values less than 1s as they are hardly representative. The exact same com-
putation have been done with memory usages. For each tool tested in [LTV10]
we compare the results obtained with the new version and the former one, all
theses results can also be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
CL-Atse: We compare the version 2.2-5, released in 2006 with the version
2.3-4, released in 2009. By looking at the speedup indicator, the tool seems
slightly slower in its newer version (0.97 times on average). The old version has
a minimum memory usage of about 1570 Kb (reached in 53% of the protocols).
This minimum has increased to about 5024 Kb (reached in 90% of the protocols).
Thus, we can notice that memory usages are pretty stable in particular with the
new version.
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Table 1: Comparison of all the tools on 13 protocols using XOR on secrecy properties
(memory consumptions in Kb).
OFMC: We compare the version 2006 of the tool with the version 2014. Here
we can notice a more clear trend on the reduction of timings (around 1.29 times
faster), contrasted by a clear trend on the augmentation of memory usages (0.45,
meaning more than doubling). However, unlike we previously said on CL-Atse,
memory usage of OFMC can vary a lot (from 5341 Kb to more than 717 Mb).
This can be explained by the fact that OFMC is looking for some fix points and
this research can require a large memory.
ProVerif: We compare the version 1.16, released in 2008 with the version
1.90 released in early 2015. Looking at the representative timings, we are not able
to notice any clear variation (BAPv2 and BAPv2-fix are slower but Salary Sum v2
Pr
ot
oc
ol
C
L
-A
ts
e
O
FM
C
TA
4S
P
D
H
-P
ro
V
er
if
Ta
m
ar
in
Sc
yt
he
r
Sp
ee
du
p
st
ud
ie
d
v2
.3
-4
[T
ur
06
]
20
14
[B
M
V
03
]
20
14
[B
H
K
O
04
]
1.
90
[B
la
01
,B
la
04
]
0.
9.
0
[S
M
C
B
12
,M
SC
B
13
]
1.
1.
3
[C
re
08
]
C
L
-A
ts
e
O
FM
C
Pr
oV
er
if
D
H
0.
02
s
50
60
0.
04
s
54
08
0.
36
s
51
73
6
0.
01
s
46
16
5.
23
s
23
94
4
0.
01
s
61
0
=
0.
31
=
0.
46
=
0.
86
[D
H
76
]
+
0.
03
s
50
64
+
0.
04
s
53
64
+
0.
36
s
51
68
4
+
0.
01
s
46
16
+
5.
32
s
25
04
6
+
0.
01
s
60
8
=
0.
31
=
0.
43
=
0.
86
U
N
SA
FE
=
0.
05
s
50
64
=
0.
08
s
54
08
=
0.
72
s
51
73
6
=
0.
02
s
46
16
=
10
.5
4s
25
04
6
=
0.
02
s
61
0
=
0.
31
=
0.
45
=
0.
86
0.
05
s
50
24
0.
05
s
58
85
0.
01
s
49
34
0.
18
s
63
1
=
0.
31
=
0.
46
=
0.
87
IK
A
+
0.
05
s
50
24
+
0.
05
s
65
09
N
o
re
su
lt
+
0.
01
s
49
02
D
oe
s
no
te
nd
+
0.
01
s
60
6
=
0.
31
=
0.
47
=
0.
86
[A
ST
00
]
+
0.
05
s
50
24
+
0.
04
s
58
01
TA
4S
P
er
ro
r
+
0.
01
s
48
78
(>
24
h)
+
0.
01
s
60
6
=
0.
31
=
0.
45
=
0.
86
U
N
SA
FE
=
0.
15
s
50
24
=
0.
14
s
65
09
St
ac
k
ov
er
flo
w
=
0.
03
s
49
34
=
0.
20
s
63
1
=
0.
31
=
0.
46
=
0.
86
SS
H
D
oe
s
no
te
nd
[Y
L
06
]S
A
FE
0.
58
s
50
24
8.
76
s
71
78
41
(>
24
h)
0.
02
s
59
02
40
.0
7s
89
79
0
0.
16
s
73
6
=
0.
36
1.
27
0.
45
=
0.
88
IK
E
v2
-D
S
[K
au
05
,K
H
N
+
14
]S
A
FE
0.
20
s
50
24
1.
12
s
10
14
86
0.
55
s
50
86
4
0.
06
s
74
41
1.
91
s
38
25
1
38
.4
6s
59
32
=
0.
36
1.
27
0.
42
=
0.
94
IK
E
v2
-D
S-
fix
[K
au
05
,K
H
N
+
14
]S
A
FE
0.
21
s
50
24
5.
58
s
53
51
96
1.
40
s
34
49
4
0.
03
s
63
73
3.
14
s
54
72
9
42
.8
1s
59
52
=
0.
36
1.
29
0.
37
=
0.
90
IK
E
v2
-D
Sv
2-
fix
[K
au
05
,K
H
N
+
14
]S
A
FE
0.
15
s
50
24
1.
09
s
98
87
8
0.
55
s
34
64
6
0.
06
s
74
25
1.
91
s
37
66
9
36
.0
4s
60
07
=
0.
31
1.
26
0.
42
=
0.
91
IK
E
v2
-C
H
IL
D
[K
au
05
,K
H
N
+
14
]S
A
FE
0.
05
s
50
23
0.
20
s
16
49
3
0.
56
s
34
46
7
0.
02
s
57
47
19
.4
4s
52
85
7
2.
24
s
14
96
=
0.
31
=
0.
41
=
0.
92
IK
E
v2
-M
A
C
[K
au
05
,K
H
N
+
14
]S
A
FE
0.
05
s
50
24
1.
06
s
96
36
5
0.
52
s
50
88
9
0.
01
s
53
95
31
.5
0s
70
71
5
4m
9s
29
17
6
=
0.
31
1.
27
0.
42
=
0.
87
Table 2: Comparaison of all the tools on 8 protocols using DH on secrecy properties
(memory consumptions in Kb).
is faster). However, ProVerif also has increased his memory usage with a variation
of 0.90. The principal aim of ProVerif is to analyse some cryptographic protocols
without equational theory. In our comparison, we use two tools developed by
R. Kuesters to analyse our protocols and they have not been updated.
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Table 3: Comparison of all the tools on authentication properties for 10 XOR and DH
protocols (memory consumptions in Kb).
3.2 Observation on the results of the new tools
Here we summarize and explain the individual results of the tools we added since
[LTV10].
TA4SP seems to have hard time when dealing with the complexity of Exclu-
sive-Or properties as only 33% of our protocols produce a result. Moreover, the
performances of TA4SP are far behind CL-Atse, OFMC and ProVerif. However,
when dealing with Diffie-Hellman properties, TA4SP is pretty competitive as
its timings are close to the ones of CL-Atse, OFMC and ProVerif. Its memory
usages are also always higher than CL-Atse and ProVerif but lower then OFMC
in 75% of our protocols.
Tamarin seems really slower than CL-Atse and ProVerif either on secrecy or
authentication. It is only faster than OFMC when checking IKEv2-DS-fix. The
reason may be that the granularity of the modelling is too thin and complexifies
the analysis. However, Tamarin is the only tool being able to deal with temporal
properties and it would be interesting to try to analyse some protocols using
Diffie-Hellman and satisfying such properties.
Scyther does not have Diffie-Hellman properties built in its algorithm. We
use a trick that consists to introduce an extra role in the protocol to perform the
commutation of the exponentiation, This role is a kind of oracle that is called
by the tool when a protocol is analysed. Then Scyther is able to compete with
other tools. In selected protocols, the Diffie-Hellman oracle is only called on
small messages, then Scyther is pretty efficient (for example in SSH). However,
protocols such as IKEv2-CHILD or IKEv2-MAC are still to complex for this
hack and would need Diffie-Hellman properties to be built in the tool to be able
to compete with other tools.
An interesting example with Scyther is the IKEv2-DS protocol. The Internet
Key Exchange version 2, Digital Signatures variant (IKEv2-DS ) aims at estab-
lishing mutual authentication between two parties using an IKE Security As-
sociation (SA) that includes shared secret information. The first two exchanges
of messages establishing an IKE SA are called the IKE SA INIT exchange and
the IKE AUTH exchange. During IKE SA INIT, users exchange nonces and
establishes a Diffie-Hellman key. Then IKE AUTH authenticates the previous
messages, exchanges the user identities and establish an IKE SA.
Protocol IKEv2-DS:
1. A→ B : SA1.gx.Na
2. B → A : SA1.gy.Nb
3. A→ B : {A.{SA1.gx.Na.Nb}inv(pk(A)).SA2}h(Na.Nb.SA1.gxy)
4. B → A : {B.{SA1.gy.Nb.Na}inv(pk(B)).SA2}h(Na.Nb.SA1.gxy)
Where x.y denotes the pair of message x and y. In this given form, IKEv2-
DS is vulnerable to an authentication attack11 where the intruder is able to
impersonate A when speaking to B. However, he is not able to learn gxy, the
key shared by only A and B making this attack unexploitable.
To prevent the attack against IKEv2-DS, S. Mo¨dersheim and P. Hankes
Drielsma proposed on the Avispa’s website12 to add an extension consisting of
11 http://www.avispa-project.org/library/IKEv2-DS.html
12 http://www.avispa-project.org/library/IKEv2-DSx.html
two messages, each containing a nonce and a distinguished constant encrypted
with the IKE SA INIT key. This version is denoted by IKEv2-DS-fix.
As C. Cremers already mentioned in [Cre11], specifying explicitly the respon-
der’s identify in the first message of the IKE AUTH exchange also prevents this
attack. We denote by IKEv2-DSv2-fix this version. This parameter is specified as
optional in Section 1.2 of [KHN+14]. This way, Step 3. of the protocol becomes:
A− > B : {A,B, {SA1.gx.Na.Nb}inv(pk(A)), SA2}h(Na.Nb.SA1.gxy)
As mentioned in the introduction, the difference of modelling between IKEv2-
DS which was proposed in the Avispa library and IKEv2-DSv2-fix which was
included in Scyther’s library was indeed changing the result of the security anal-
ysis since the later was already fixed. It would not have been easy to spot this
difference as the two protocols were modeled in different languages and as the
parameter added in IKEv2-DSv2-fix was supposed optional. Again such tiny
changes require the user to deeply understand the input language of each tool
and to understand the original specification of the protocol to be noticed.
Moreover, still in [Cre11], C. Cremers also proposed a more detailed version of
IKEv2-DS, IKEv2-DSv2-fix and IKEv2-MAC adding other parameters specified
in [KHN+14] but this time not affecting on the result of the analysis. We also run
these modelisations with Scyther and interestingly, these additional parameters
slow down the tool when analysing IKEv2-DS and IKEv2-DSv2-fix but accelerate
it when we check IKEv2-MAC. This shows how modifications not relevant at the
first sight can drastically change the performances and even the results of a tool.
3.3 Further analyses
In this section, our aim is to measure the impact of the number of variables
involved in Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman on each tools.
Analysis of the influence of Exclusive-Or operator: We propose the following
unsafe family of protocols called Pxori.
1. A→ B : Nai
2. B → A : Nai ⊕ Sb
Where Nai is result of i fresh nonces xored and Sb is a secret that B wants to
share with A. So for instance, if i = 3, the protocol Pxor3 is defined such as:
1. A→ B : Na1 ⊕Na2 ⊕Na3
2. B → A : Na1 ⊕Na2 ⊕Na3 ⊕ Sb
With Na1 ⊕Na2 ⊕Na3 = xor(Na1, Na2, Na3). Moreover, we test how the
tools handle Exclusive-Or. Thus we also consider a variant P-nestedxori in which
(Na1 ⊕ Na2) ⊕ Na3 = xor(xor(Na1, Na2), Na3). This does not make any dif-
ference for XOR-ProVerif since the intermediate files produced are strictly the
same.
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Fig. 1: Performances of the tools on the Pxori and P-nestedxori protocols
For each tool, Figure 1a represents timings and Figure 1b represents mem-
ory consumptions in function of the number of nonces sent by A in the Pxori
protocol. We stopped runs taking more than one hour. All tools are able to
find attacks when they did terminate. We can see that CL-Atse is barely not
able to deal with more than five variables in an Exclusive-Or. XOR-ProVerif
is able to handle up to eight but taking a really long time. However, OFMC
seems to perfectly handle this constraint, keeping both his timings and memory
consumptions almost constant.
This experimentation demonstrates that the number of variables in Exclusive-
Or operators has a clear impact on the tools. It is a factor of complexity explosion
like the number of roles, the number of sessions, the number of nonces and the
number of participants. OFMC seems to use an efficient strategy to handle a
“global” Exclusive-Or.
Figure 1c represents timings for each tool function of the number of nonces
sent by A in the P-nestedxori protocol. Figure 1d is the same with memory
consumptions. All tools are able to find attacks when they did terminate. We
can see that CL-Atse has results very close to our experimentation without
nested Exclusive-Or. XOR-ProVerif has the exact same behavior as it does not
make any difference with prioritized Exclusive-Or or not. This time we can see
that OFMC is affected by the number of Exclusive-Or operations growing and
is able to handle up to eleven Exclusive-Or.
Analysis of the influence of Diffie-Hellman operator: We propose the follow-
ing family of unsecure protocols Pdhi to measure the impact of Diffie-Hellman
exponentiations.
1. A→ B : gNai
2. B → A : gNbi
3. A→ B : {S}(gNai )Nbi
The protocol Pdhi contains i nonces from A and also i nonces from B so
that (gNai)Nbi = exp(g,Na1, . . . , Nai, Nb1, . . . , Nbi). We also consider the P-
nesteddhi protocol where
(gNai)Nbi = exp(g, exp(Na1, exp(. . . , exp(Nai, exp(Nb1, exp(. . . , Nbi))))))
Figure 2a represents timings for each tool in function of the number of nonces
sent by A and B in the Pdhi protocol. Figure 2b is the same with memory con-
sumptions. When they did terminate, all tools are able to find attacks. We ob-
serve that all tools are able to deal with more variables involved in Diffie-Hellman
exponentiations than in Exclusive-Or. This due to the fact that Exclusive-Or
has four properties, including commutativity, while Diffie-Hellman only has one
(commutativity). DH-ProVerif is able to handle up to eleven nonces in each role
before taking too much time. CL-Atse reasonably manages 24 variables with its
timing slowly growing and its memory stays constant. OFMC has the exact same
behavior as with Pxori, staying constant in timings and memory usage.
Figure 2c and Figure 2d respectively represents timings and memory con-
sumptions for each tool function of the number of nonces sent by A and B in
the P-nesteddhi protocol. All tools find some attacks if they terminate. We can
modelize the nested Diffie-Hellman exponentiations using a rewriting rule di-
rectly in ProVerif 1.90 using Pi-calculus and without using DH-ProVerif (the
syntax does not allow exponentiation operators with arity greater than two and
exclude tests on Pdhi). Thus we differentiate results from DH-ProVerif, the algo-
rithm from [KT09] with the results from ProVerif. This time, DH-ProVerif and
OFMC are impacted when we increase the number of nonces of the protocol.
DH-ProVerif ends up limited by its timing while OFMC fills the memory of the
system. Interestingly, this time CL-Atse is perfectly able to handle the nested
Diffie-Hellman exponentiations, keeping its timing and memory constant. The
modelisation using ProVerif’s Pi-calculus language also seems very powerful.
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Fig. 2: Performances of the tools on the Pi and P-nestedi protocols
4 Conclusion
In the last decades several automatic verification tools for cryptographics proto-
cols have been developed. They are really useful to help the designer to construct
secure protocols against the well known Dolev-Yao intruder. Only few of these
tools are able to analyse algebraic properties. In this work we compare the exe-
cution time and the memory consumption of the main free tools that can deal
with Exclusive-Or and Diffie-Hellman properties. We use a large benchmark
of 21 protocols. In this competition there is not a clear winner. However we
can see that recent tools can deal with some of these properties. For instance
Tamarin offers the verification of new temporal properties and consider Diffie-
Hellman property. We also construct two families of protocols to evaluate how
the performances of existing tools, that are able to consider the Exclusive-Or
and Diffie-Hellman operators, are influenced by the number of operators in the
protocol. We clearly see that the complexity is exponential in function of the
number of operators used with variables. We also notice that the modelling is
an important step in the verification of cryptographic protocols and it can really
influence their performance. Moreover each tool has is own strategy based on
his theoretical foundations to find attack or to prove the security properties, it
is not surprising that there is not a clear winner of our comparison on the set of
protocols since algebraic operators introduce a new factor of complexity in the
verification procedures.
In the future, we plan to run all Diffie-Hellman examples using the Pi-calculus
specification of ProVerif in order to directly compare it with DH-ProVerif on
real scale protocols. We also would like to continue our analysis in a fair way
as the authors of [CLN09] did. It would be very interesting to push further our
investigations on the impact of different parameters on each tool (such as the
number of participants or the length of each protocol). Finally, in [CvDP09]
X. Chen et al. proposed an improve algorithm of XOR-ProVerif. We plan to
compare this new version with the one from [KT09,KT08] to measure these
improvements. Protocols using elliptic curve cryptography are becoming more
and more important and it would be great to analyse them. However, for the time
being, none of these tools are able to support such complex algebraic properties.
Acknowledgments: We deeply thank all the tools authors for their helpful ad-
vises.
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